On March 7, tens of thousands of people took them to Slovak streets for the third time this year to protest the policies of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. They expressed concern that Slovakia was drifting from the European Union and its transatlantic allies.
Their fears are well-founded. Since fall 2023, a coalition of nationalists, EU skeptics and pro-Russian political parties has been in power in Bratislava. The FICO’s left-wing Smer party promotes the rhetoric of pro-Lucia, while the Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS) promotes the “Panslavic Brotherhood” with Moscow. The results are the same: Under FICO, Slovakia is moving in a similar direction to Victor Orban’s Hungary.
The FICO government has demonstrated clear integrity with Moscow. In September 2024, he falsely claimed that Nazi forces were fighting in Ukraine. He was also the first prime minister of the EU member state to allow interviews with the Russian state television channel Rossia 1.
In October 2024, Bosš Blaha, a member of the European Parliament of FICO’s Smer, traveled to Moscow to “apologise to the Russians for EU sanctions,” saying, “fascism and war come from the west, freedom and peace come from the east.”
FICO met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in December 2024 and had already accepted Putin’s invitation to Moscow in May 2025.
The government’s pro-Russian stance, Liberal opposition Liberal Party’s Freedom and Solidarity (SAS) is concerned that it has proposed to shrink Slovak EU membership in the constitution. The response from the FICO camp was both amazing and surprising. Tibor Gaspal, a former police chief charged with criminal conduct and now a smart politician, suggested that Slovakia should consider leaving the EU to decide whether rules will be changed. Even President Peter Pellegrini, a native of HLAS, a coalition partner, distanced himself from Gaspal’s remarks.
While it may seem unlikely to be possible from the EU, many citizens have been deeply unstable due to government directions. This frustration prompted protesters to rock the Ukrainian flag, under “Ukrainian peace” and encouraged protests from the rallying public.
However, FICO responds with conspiracy theory. When his government faced a non-confident vote in January 2025 – after losing several lawmakers and a potential parliamentary majority, he called for a closed session, claiming that Slovak intelligence agency (led by the son of Tibor Gaspal) had warned him of an attempted coup.
According to FICO, the NGOs operating in Ukraine and Georgia had planned to overthrow him. There is no evidence, but it reflects the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Around the same time Orbán himself visited Bratislava to further strengthen the relationship between the two leaders. Ultimately, FICO was able to block no-confidence votes despite the government’s fragile majority.
FICO’s Orban-like approach extends beyond foreign policy to domestic issues. Ironically, FICO pursued anti-Hungarian minority policies in his first semester (2006–2010) – now become a close ally of Orban. Even the Hungarian minority in Slovak is consistent with the FICO anti-Uraine pro-Russian stance.
Like Orbán, FICO has worked to undermine democratic checks and balances. He amended the criminal law for his interest, restructured the public media to silence critical journalists, allowing social media nationalist ministers to engage in political wars with artists (theatres and museum directors were denied and replaced by loyalists).
Despite these troubling developments, Slovakia under FICO remains more free and pluralistic than Orban’s Hungary. The key difference is stability. While Orban has been a majority in the Congress since 2010, the FICO coalition is vulnerable and divided. Some lawmakers from his small coalition partners, SNS and HLA, have already left the government, although they have not voted against him.
The pro-Russian attitude of FICO has so far been a more rhetorical tool for domestic politics. Unlike Orban, he ultimately did not block the EU’s decision on Ukraine in early March. He hopes the European Union will ensure Slovakia’s gas supply.
FICO’s pragmatism can also be explained by the fact that it is not fully supported, especially within his own coalition, particularly by President Peter Pellegrini’s HLAS party. At the same time, the issue of Ukraine is once again a key mobilisation force for Slovak opposition, in contrast to Hungary. Hungarian opposition avoids open and direct conflict with Orban on the issue from opportunism, but tens of thousands of people take them to the city of Slovak to support Ukraine and demonstrate against the policies of FICO’s pro-Lucia.
Political instability and increased public resistance continue to put pressure on FICO. On the streets of Slovak cities, the Ukrainian flag has become a symbol of pro-European commitment for many. As FICO argues, they are not “foreign agents,” but decent Slovakian citizens who want to avoid obanizing their country.
Editor’s note: The opinions expressed in the OP-ED section are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Kiev’s independence.
As history repeats itself in Ukraine, we set up again to abandon our partners
Paris in January 1973. Doha in February 2000. Saudi Arabia February 2025 – All peaceful peaks with the same scent and feel. But before we assume that the stage is simply set to another American episode of “cut and run,” there is an important difference. After years of commitment to not do anything
Peter Techet
Research Associates at the Danube and Central European Institutes
