US President Donald Trump’s second administration has brought structural changes to European security calculations. With growing uncertainty over the US cuts and the collapse of post-World War II security arrangements, European leaders scrambled to submit alternatives.
“We need to discuss both the British and French European nuclear powers and at least nuclear security from the UK and France would apply to the US,” said Friedrich Merz, head of the Christian Democratic Union, which was already expected to become the next German prime minister ahead of last month’s election.
Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron said that in response to Mertz it had decided to “open a strategic debate on protecting allies on the continent through nuclear deterrence.”
The proposal for some form of European nuclear sharing arrangement with France and the UK to protect against threats from Moscow is not new. That version has been floating around for decades.
But resurfaceting this proposal today is not merely a geopolitical miscalculation. It’s a strategic dead end. This reflects misreading of both the nuclear balance of the nuclear balance and the existential risks that further fragment the European security architecture. Rather than strengthening deterrent, this gambit risks accelerating the very instability that is seeking avoidance.
Amid the growing unpredictability of US-Russia relations under the Second Trump administration, Europe must challenge a bold agenda of diplomatic engagement on nuclear disarmament from nuclear flight.
European nuclear sharing fantasy
The proposals of European nuclear sharing founders on arithmetic and strategic realities. Russian nuclear weapons boast 5,580 warheads, including the Hi-Sonic Avanguard Glide Vehicle and the Salmat Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This wars down the combined Anglo-French stockpile of 515 warheads.
This asymmetry is not merely quantitative. It is also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalating to escalate” strategy represents a calculated approach to conflict escalation designed to concede the enemy. This is a strategy that British and French nuclear weapons optimized for minimal deterrence cannot be countered.
Data on defense spending reveals deeper flaws. Europeans do not have the funds or technical capabilities to carry out the ambitious re-soldier plan while still implementing it.
Germany’s 9.06 billion euros ($98 billion) military budget remains crippled by inefficiency, with only 50% of Army equipment meeting NATO preparatory standards. Meanwhile, France and the UK lack the traditional force multipliers (global surveillance networks, intelligence capabilities, and even a complete nuclear triad) that the US supports. Even if all Eurocents in the European Union’s recently announced 800 billion euro ($867 billion) defence boost are spent on nuclear weapons programs, it will take decades to cold start the kind of production complex needed for reliable deterrents.
Attempting to replicate NATO’s nuclear model at the European level ignores the 60-year integrated command structure and fails to address the hybrid threat that defines modern conflict.
Furthermore, replacing one dependency with another does not resolve anything. Supporters argue that nuclear sharing provides protection, but in reality it can lead to strategic conquests.
Neither France nor the UK can renounce control over its nuclear weapons or transfer it to the EU. This means that the nuclear sharing agreement will allow Germany and other European countries to participate in the arrangements for the Franco-British warhead warehouse, which have no actual institutions. This Potomkin deterrence – all rituals, no substance – only makes Washington even more frustrating.
Trump has already shown that he is not worried about abandoning his allies if he deems no benefits to the US strategic interests. His recent move to stop sharing intelligence news and military aid in Ukraine, as well as his conditioning mutual defense against military spending, revealed the norms of NATO’s fraying – the alliance has witnessed the collapse of shared purpose.
As experts have pointed out, Trump’s “Magakarta” foreign policy explicitly rejects strategic altruism. The European nuclear caucus has signaled panic and undermined NATO unity while examining the worldview of Trump’s trading.
European nuclear clubs deepen fragmentation and encourage revisionist actors like Russia and China, diverting resources from the key gaps in AI progress, sustainable economic production, and energy resilience that define power in the 21st century.
Economic debate exacerbates stupidity. While pouring billions of euros from European finite resources into redundant warheads, ignoring the actual gaps in traditional capabilities, not statecraft, it’s not a generational misconduct.
Disarmament and financial real politics
The EU opportunity is to activate weapons control and mediation, not nuclear stance. The collapse of US-Russia’s strategic dialogue since the Ukrainian invasion has led to disruption to the critical weapons control framework.
The new starting treaty, which limits Russian and US strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each, remains the final pillar of both sides of weapons control. The expiration without succession in 2026 will mark the first time since 1972 that the world’s nuclear superpowers operate without mutually verified restrictions.
There are European opportunities here. Rather than pursuing a European nuclear umbrella, it could lead efforts to revive nuclear disarmament dialogue.
Austria, a member of the EU, has already played a key role in nuclear talks between the West and Iran, debating the 2020 US-China trilateral arms control debate. This positions it as an ideal place to resume negotiations on the issue of nuclear risk reduction, especially at a time when Washington is embracing a new dialogue with Moscow.
Leading nuclear disarmament is like leadership that reflects a more mature interpretation of security policies rather than seeking impossible nuclear deterrence.
Some critics have insisted that negotiations with Russia will reward the attack. However, history shows that even bitter enemies can cooperate with weapon control when interests are consistent. The 1987 Medium-range Nuclear Treaty, which eliminated 2,692 missiles, was finalized in the early 1980s after years of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States increased.
The treaty is not because US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev trusted each other, but because dismantling missiles saved a substantial amount of money to continue the arms race and maintain the ordinance that was destroyed.
Today, when Russia’s economy sways amidst the war in Ukraine and the lockdowns on Trump’s cost reductions, there is an opportunity to pursue another deal if disarmament is framed as financial pragmatism rather than idealism. Europe can help mediate transactions that help the wallets of all political parties and the survival of humanity.
The unintended consequences of Trump’s first nuclear gambit — the escalation of the Arms Race, the eroded alliance, and the brave enemy — provide a careful lesson. However, his second semester can provide the opportunity to turn the end clock back from the 89 second position into the middle of the night.
Europe is now facing choice. They are pioneers of a security paradigm that either clings to Cold War relics while the planet is burning or prioritizes planet survival over the vanity of the great power. The decisions it makes define not only the future of Europe, but everything about humanity.
The views expressed in this article are the authors themselves and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
