The US International Religious Freedom Committee raised concerns last month in a report on a new Ukrainian law designed to regulate religious groups with ties to foreign forces.
However, while critics of the law say it limits religious freedom, voices within the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine have said they believe that the law is necessary to monitor the situation carefully and fight Ukraine’s dangerous ideology.
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Ukrainian President Voldy Meezelensky signed a legislation granting state authorities restricting religious groups affiliated with foreign companies operating in countries engaged in war against Ukraine. The law primarily targets the Russian Orthodox Church and ROC. Lasky Meal Ideology has served as an ideological justification for the full-scale invasion of Russia’s Ukraine, which began in February 2022.
The law also indirectly affects Ukrainian Orthodox churches known as the UOC.
The UOC is considered to be the autonomous arm in Ukraine by Roc’s Moscow Patriachate. However, many UOC clergy and congregations claim that their church was broken in Moscow in May 2022.
In Ukraine, it leaves behind the nature of the standard status of the UOC and its continued relationship with Moscow’s patriarchy. Although the church believes it is independent, it continues to face public and state skepticism about its connection to Moscow’s patriarchy.
However, questions about the Religious Practices Act of 2024 raise broader questions about Christianity in Ukraine.
USCIRF Annual Reportwhich was released on March 25th, expressed concern that the 2024 law could impose “unbalanced restrictions on freedom to demonstrate religion and belief.”
The committee urges the Ukrainian government to ensure compliance with international human rights standards and repeats a similar reservation filed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in December
In response to these concerns, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry issued a clarification in January, explaining that the country’s religious practices law “does not prohibit churches that exist in Ukraine.”
The ministry stressed that the law aims to target organizational subordinates, “it merely prohibits subordination to leadership centres in states where the subordinates of Ukrainian religious groups have committed or committed armed invasions against Ukraine.”
The distinction has been criticised elsewhere, but Pauling suggests that it retains its importance for most Ukrainians.
According to an October 2024 poll conducted by the Razumkov Center, 75% of respondents support the legal provisions, with only 7% opposed.
Additionally, 80% support the ban on religious groups that promote it Lasky Meal Ideology, only 6% opposed that stance.
Among many Ukrainian Greek Catholics, the law is viewed as not a threat to religious freedom, but as a necessary measure to protect it from weaponization.
Fr. Fihas of Rome, director of the Ecumenical Institute at the Catholic University of Ukraine, Pillars The law was passed in response to the ideological role played by the Russian Orthodox Church, which supports Russian invasion.
“Rock and its Lasky Meal Ideology has served as a justification for the central ideology of this attack. “The ban on this ideology is necessary both from national security and from the protection of religious freedom.”
Figus acknowledged the potential impact of the law on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, especially given the fact that some UOC clergy, including some members of the Church’s governing council, worked with the Russian occupation authorities.
Still, Fihas said he views the law as an opportunity. This seeks to encourage UOCs to distance themselves from the ROC and to engage in deeper dialogue with other Orthodox butlers in Ukraine.
“Despite its shortcomings, the law represents an attempt by the state to separate UOC from ROC and its destructive effects,” Fihas said.
He emphasized that UOC followers can worship freely and that church property has not been confiscated.
“The viable path for the UOC could be constructive internal transformation through open dialogue with society and other Christian churches, as opposed to the position of isolation taken by the church,” he added.
Ihol Shaban, director of the Committee on Interfaith Dialogue and Ecumenical Issues of Father Ukraine’s Greek Catholic Church’s Committee on Interfaith Dialogue and Ecumenical Issues, argued that the law should not be banned, but should be considered a safeguard.
“This is not a (UOC) ban,” he said.
Shaban pointed out that the ROC is being used by the Kremlin to militarize religious rhetoric and justify violence.
Shabang outlined four important principles that the UGCC believes need to guide the implementation of such laws. It emphasizes partnership between the church and the nation, cooperation for the common good. It ensures that the church is not liked by the state, equal treatment of all denominations. Mutual in-interference, healthy separation of issues of the state and the church. The recognition that states have an obligation to act in the field of religious security, particularly in protecting people from instrumentalization and militarization of the church system.
“It’s important for the world to know that there is no state church in Ukraine,” Shaban said. “Religious life in Ukraine remains free and vibrant. Collaboration with different denominations – Orthodox, Catholic, Protestants and even other religions is today the number one priority for our interchurch and interfaith communication.”
Another Ukrainian expert argued that the situation in this country could be difficult to understand people living in Western countries.
Myroslav Marynovych, chairman of the UCU’s Institute of Religious Associations and former political prisoner of Soviet Glag, argued that the Western perspective could be too detached from the reality facing Ukraine, particularly. Lasky meal.
“These are not mere religious ideas, but rather deep-woven hybrid religious and political ideologies. At its heart is the denial of the fundamental rights of the Ukrainian people to political and cultural identities and independence. The declaration from representatives of the Russian Church is spiritually political, not spiritual unity, which is fashionable. Pillar.
“As a result, the Ukrainian state has both a right and a duty to protect security from such interference,” he added. r
Marynovych emphasized that restrictions on activities can only be applied to certain religious organizations, not to the entire UOC.
Olexa Petrif, director of external relations at the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, said PillarsrEven during the drafting stage of the bill, meetings took place between the chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament and the All-Ukrainian Church and the Council of Religious Organizations.
All members, including representatives of the UOC, agreed that the state has the right to protect its sovereignty and internal security, Petriv said that the state provided respect for legal equality in a legal way, and especially among all churches without discrimination or preference of anyone.
Petriff, who was close to drafting the bill, explained:
“We have monitored this closely to ensure that these basic principles are being followed, and this was the position of the entire Council of Ukrainian Churches. The adopted law took all these points into consideration.
“Individuals who are representatives of a particular denomination can be accountable,” Petrib said. “And in fact there are even criminal cases against representatives of one sect, but they are considered by the courts on a personal basis. Meanwhile, the law is particularly concerned with religious organizations that fall within the realm of administrative law, which relate to legal institutions.”
According to Petrib, provisions that punish religious groups if they violate the law are not novel.
The Ukrainian law on religious organizations and freedom of conscience, adopted in 1991, already includes norms and procedures for terminating the registration of a religious organization through a court if it violates Ukrainian law.
“This is a completely legal process,” he said. “It has been in Ukrainian law for 34 years. What has changed is that the Russian Church has become the conductor of an offensive war against the Ukrainian state itself. The law therefore establishes that this structure poses a threat to national security.
According to Petrif, UGCC leaders do not believe that law threatens religious freedom, as this issue is one important aspect of its relationship with the state.
“We’ve been monitoring this very carefully for at least the last 25 years since our department was there.”
“Our church has experienced decades of persecution and underground existence, so we are very sensitive to this issue and we are also overseeing not only us, but all Ukrainian councils of churches and religious organizations representing more than 90% of all religious communities in Ukraine,” he said.
“We are the watchdogs of religious freedom and we respond as soon as we see issues.”
